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PREVIEW; Keefe v. Kirkegard: Constitutional Implications of 
Sentencing a Juvenile to Life Imprisonment Without the 




 The Montana Supreme Court is scheduled to hear oral 
arguments in the matter of Keefe v. Kirkegard on September 11, 
2020, at 9:30 a.m. via Zoom. John R. Mills will likely appear on 
behalf of Appellant Steven Wayne Keefe, and Timothy C. Fox will 




This case comes to the Montana Supreme Court more than 
thirty-three years after a triple homicide conviction. The issues 
presented are: (1) whether Keefe was unconstitutionally deprived 
expert assistance; (2) whether Keefe was provided a proper 
resentencing hearing in accordance with Miller v. Alabama1; (3) 
whether the district court incorrectly relied on expert testimony 
when fixing Keefe’s sentence; and (4) whether Keefe was denied a 
fair and impartial hearing, thereby violating his constitutional right 
to due process.2 It is significant because it  considers whether 
sentencing a juvenile to life imprisonment without parole, absent a 
jury finding irreparable corruption and permanent incorrigibility, 
violates the Sixth or Eighth Amendments.3 Because the bulk of the 
Court’s analysis will hinge on the first two issues, the remaining two 
issues will not be addressed.  
      
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
On October 22, 1986, appellant Steven Wayne Keefe was 
convicted by a jury for three counts of deliberate homicide and one 
count of burglary.4 Keefe was sentenced to three terms of life 
imprisonment for each homicide, one ten-year term for the burglary, 
 
* J.D. Candidate, Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University of 
Montana Class of 2022.  
1 567 U.S. 460 (2012).  
2 See Appellant’s Opening Brief at 1, Keefe v. Kirkegard, 
https://juddocumentservice.mt.gov/getDocByCTrackId?DocId=290925 (Mont. 
Oct. 16, 2019) (No. DA 19-0368); Brief of Appellee at 4, Keefe v. Kirkegard, 
https://juddocumentservice.mt.gov/getDocByCTrackId?DocId=290925 (Mont. 
Apr. 27, 2020) (No. DA 19-0368). 
3 See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (holding that a finding of irreparable 
corruption and permanent incorrigibility is required to enhance a juvenile’s 
sentence from life without the possibility of parole to life with the possibility of 
parole).   
4 State v. Keefe, 759 P.2d 128, 133 (Mont. 1988).  
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and four ten-year terms for the use of a weapon, set to run 
consecutively.5 The offenses occurred on October 15, 1985, while 
Keefe was still a juvenile; he broke into a residence in Great Falls, 
Montana, and killed three individuals.6 Keefe had moved to Great 
Falls shortly before turning eighteen to seek employment, and had 
already committed more than fifty known non-violent crimes.7 
Keefe endured a difficult family life prior to moving; his father 
abandoned him and his mother at a young age, his mother neglected 
him, and he experienced abuse from a school teacher and his 
mother’s partners.8 The original sentencing court did not consider 
these factors as mitigating when imposing his sentence.9 
 
Keefe appealed his convictions in 1988 asserting evidentiary 
error, and the Montana Supreme Court affirmed.10 In 2017, Keefe’s 
petition seeking a new sentencing hearing was granted, after which 
his original sentence was re-imposed following consideration of his 
youth as a mitigating factor.11 In December of 2018, following the 
Court’s decision in Steilman v. Michael,12 the district court vacated 
Keefe’s sentence and ordered a resentencing hearing.13 Prior to the 
hearing, the district court appointed a psychiatrist to conduct a 
psychological evaluation of Keefe considering the characteristics of 
his youth and impact those characteristics may have had on his 
criminal activity.14 In April of 2019, Keefe was resentenced to three 
consecutive life sentences for each homicide count and five 
consecutive ten-year sentences for the burglary count and use of a 
firearm.15 Finally, after Keefe’s motion for reconsideration with a 
new judge was denied, Keefe gave notice of this appeal on June 27, 




5 Brief of Appellee, supra note 2, at 1.  
6 Keefe, 759 P.2d at 129–30; Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 2, at 1.   
7 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 33; Brief of Appellee, supra note 2, 
at 3–4.  
8 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 5–6.  
9 Brief of Appellee, supra note 2, at 2.  
10 Brief of Appellee, supra note 2, at 1.   
11 Brief of Appellee, supra note 2, at 2 (consideration of youth as a mitigating 
factor was required under Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) and 
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012)). 
12 407 P.3d 313 (Mont. 2017) (holding that a sentencing court must analyze the 
Miller factors when sentencing a juvenile defendant to life imprisonment without 
the possibility of parole in Montana).  
13 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 1.  
14 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 2; Brief of Appellee, supra note 2, 
at 14.  
15 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 3.  
16 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 3.  




III. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
 
When considering a sentence of life imprisonment without 
the possibility of parole in Montana, the sentencing court is required 
to analyze a number of mitigating factors related to the juvenile’s 
youth.17 Upon consideration of these factors, the parties reached 
opposing conclusions regarding whether Keefe could 
constitutionally be sentenced to life without the possibility of 
parole.18 The parties also dispute whether Keefe is constitutionally 
entitled to an expert, and whether the district court’s appointed 
psychiatrist sufficed.19  
 
A. Appellant’s Argument 
 
First, Keefe argues he was unconstitutionally deprived 
access to expert assistance because the district court’s appointed 
psychiatrist did not provide more than an examination of Keefe, 
contrary to the requirements of Ake v. Oklahoma.20 Keefe asserts he 
was entitled to an expert because his mental condition was a 
substantial factor at trial.21 Keefe claims his mental condition was a 
substantial factor because (1) the district court made it an issue when 
it appointed an expert to evaluate Keefe; (2) Keefe wanted to argue 
an absence of a mental defect to prove “transient immaturity”; and 
(3) a defendant’s mental status is “inextricably intertwined” with the 
issue of irreparable corruption, a requirement for a life sentence 
without the possibility of parole for a juvenile.22 Alternatively, 
Keefe maintains he should be granted relief to address the 
unresolved question of whether the defense is entitled to its own 
expert.23  
 
17 Steilman, 407 P.3d at 318–19.  
18 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 23; Brief of Appellee, supra note 
2, at 32.  
19 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 13–22; Brief of Appellee, supra 
note 2, at 21–28.  
20 470 U.S. 68 (1985) (stating that an indigent defendant is entitled to an expert 
to “conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and 
presentation of the defense” if certain requirements are met); Appellant’s 
Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 18–22.  
21 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 18; Appellant’s Reply Brief at 1–
6, Keefe v. Kirkegard, 
https://juddocumentservice.mt.gov/getDocByCTrackId?DocId=316586 (Mont. 
June 5, 2020) (No. DA 19-0368).   
 
22 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 18; Appellant’s Reply Brief, 
supra note 21, at 1–6.  
23 Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 21, at 4 (the Supreme Court of the United 
States declined to answer whether defense counsel is entitled to their own expert 
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Next, Keefe argues he was deprived of a proper Miller 
hearing because the district court declined to give meaningful 
consideration to the mitigating factors of Keefe’s youth at the time 
of the offense.24 Keefe argues it was error for the district court to 
disregard his evidence of post-incarceration conduct because 
juveniles have heightened capacity for improvement and integration 
back into society, and the evidence overwhelmingly supports 
Keefe’s rehabilitative efforts, refuting a finding of irreparable 
corruption at the time of the offenses.25 Further, Keefe contends 
Miller provides that evidence of childhood trauma and neglect are 
relevant to a finding of irreparable corruption, thus it was error for 
the district court to overlook Keefe’s childhood trauma and 
neglect.26 Due to the error from the insufficient Miller hearing, 
Keefe argues his sentence of life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole is violative of the Eighth Amendment’s ban on 
cruel and unusual punishment because it is disproportionate to his 
offenses committed as a juvenile.27  
 
Finally, Keefe argues he was entitled to jury resolution 
regarding whether Keefe was irreparably corrupt because such a 
finding enhances his sentence by making him ineligible for parole.28 
Keefe maintains that it violates the Sixth Amendment to sentence 
juveniles to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole in 
Montana absent a jury finding that the juvenile’s offenses reflect 
irreparable corruption and permanent incorrigibility rather than 
transient immaturity.29 Keefe claims these errors were not harmless, 
and as a result, he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing in front of 




as part of the defense team, Ake, 470 U.S. at 83, but Keefe maintains that Ake 
alludes to the conclusion that the defense is entitled to their own expert).  
24 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 23–27; Appellant’s Reply Brief, 
supra note 21, at 7. 
25 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 27–33; Appellant’s Reply Brief, 
supra note 21, at 11–12 (citing United States v. Briones, 929 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 
2019) to assert that evidence of rehabilitation is important to determine whether 
the defendant was irreparably corrupt and permanently incorrigible at the time 
of the offense). 
26 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 36–39.  
27 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 41–42.   
28 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 40–42 (arguing that Blakely v. 
Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); 
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); and MONT. CODE ANN. § 41–1–
401 require that any fact used to enhance a sentence must be found by a jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt). 
29 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 41–42.  
30 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 54. 




B. Appellee’s Argument 
 
The State of Montana disputes that Keefe was unconstitutionally 
deprived of expert assistance because the district court’s 
appointment of a psychiatrist to evaluate him provided him with 
access to “one competent psychiatrist.”31 Further, the State asserts 
that Keefe was not entitled to an expert because he did not 
demonstrate that the presence of a mental disease or defect was at 
issue and his case is not a capital case.32 Additionally, the State 
argues it was not improper for the court to appoint a psychological 
expert because courts in Montana have discretion over the mental 
examination of a defendant.33  
 
Next, the State argues the district court properly assessed the 
Miller factors when resentencing Keefe because, despite Keefe’s 
youth, he was competent and did not act out of juvenile 
impulsiveness or reactivity.34 The State supports this assertion by 
explaining that Keefe was capable of “extricating” himself from his 
dysfunctional family life; he was almost the age of majority at the 
time of the offense, and he was sober and acted independently.35 The 
State further claims that Keefe’s statements made at his trial as a 
juvenile, coupled with his psychological assessments, confirm his 
competency and independence.36 The State argues Keefe did not 
exhibit potential for rehabilitation at sentencing due to his criminal 
history, antisocial personality disorder, and failure in youth 
treatment facilities.37 Finally, the State contends that a jury was not 
obliged to conclude whether Keefe was irreparably corrupt, and the 
judge was correct to do so because the sentencing court is afforded 







31 Brief of Appellee, supra note 2, at 24–26.  
32 Brief of Appellee, supra note 2, at 24–26.  
33 Brief of Appellee, supra note 2, at 27–29 (distinguishing United States v. Pete, 
819 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2016) and citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 46–18–112(4)).  
34 Brief of Appellee, supra note 2, at 32.  
35 Brief of Appellee, supra note 2, at 32–35.  
36 Brief of Appellee, supra note 2, at 32–37 (distinguishing Miller v. Alabama, 
567 U.S. 460 (2012)).   
37 Brief of Appellee, supra note 2, at 38, 42–43.  
38 Brief of Appellee, supra note 2, at 45 (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 
466 (2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46–1–401).  





A. Expert Assistance 
 
To determine whether Keefe was unconstitutionally 
deprived expert assistance, the Court will primarily rely on Ake v. 
Oklahoma, which entitles an indigent defendant access to a 
competent psychiatrist for the purpose of conducting an 
“appropriate examination and assist[ing] in evaluation, preparation, 
and presentation of the defense” if the defendant demonstrates that 
their sanity at the time of the offense will be a “significant factor” at 
trial.39 Despite the appellee’s argument that Ake is inapplicable to 
Keefe’s case because it is not a capital case, the Court will likely 
proceed with an Ake analysis because the holding in Ake has not 
been limited to capital cases.40 Rather, this idea was expressed solely 
in Justice Burger’s concurrence, which is not binding law.41 As the 
parties do not dispute that Keefe is indigent, the Court’s dispositive 
determination will be whether Keefe met the threshold requirement 
to entitle him to an expert pursuant to Ake by demonstrating to the 
district court that his sanity at the time of the offense would be a 
significant factor at trial.42  
 
The Court will likely find that Keefe is entitled to an expert, 
but not for the same reasons that Keefe argues (that the district court 
made his sanity an issue when it appointed a psychiatrist to examine 
him). This is because precedent dictates that the defendant must 
make the “preliminary showing” that their sanity will be a 
substantial factor in order to procure an expert under Ake.43 As in 
Ake, where the defendant utilized an insanity defense at trial, 
Keefe’s desire to prove absence of insanity or mental disease or 
defect to support a finding of “transient immaturity” would 
correspondingly make his sanity a substantial factor at the 
resentencing hearing.44 Because Ake is applicable at the sentencing 
phase, Keefe demonstrated his sanity would be a substantial factor.45 
Alternatively, if the Court determines that Keefe is entitled to a jury 
 
39 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985).   
40 Id.  
41 Id. at 87 (Burger, J., concurring, stating that “[n]othing in the Court’s opinion 
reaches non-capital cases.”). 
42 Brief of Appellee, supra note 2, at 21–22.  
43 See Ake, 470 U.S. at 83 (explaining that defendant must make a “preliminary 
showing” that his sanity will be a substantial factor).  
44 Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 21, at 1–2; Brief of Appellee, supra note 
2, at 24.  
45 Smith v. McCormick, 914 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that “[t]his 
right applies not only at trial, but also in ‘the sentencing phase.’”) (citing Ake, 470 
U.S. at 83–84).   
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determination regarding irreparable corruption and permanent 
incorrigibility, then Keefe’s sanity at the time of the offense is likely 
a substantial factor at trial because such a finding necessarily 
involves considerations of his mental capacity, as a defendant 
cannot consistently exhibit capacity for rehabilitation and be 
irreparably corrupt.46  
 
 Assuming the Court determines Keefe properly 
demonstrated his sanity was a substantial factor or is entitled to jury 
resolution regarding irreparable corruption, it will next need to 
ascertain whether the appointed expert fulfilled the requirements 
mandated by Ake. To do so, the Court will look to precedent set forth 
in McWilliams v. Dunn47 and Smith v. McCormick.48 In McWilliams, 
the Supreme Court of the United States emphasized that an 
examination by a psychiatrist, without more, will not suffice and 
concluded the defendant was unconstitutionally deprived his right 
to an expert due to the lack of availability of an expert to help 
evaluate medical records and examinations or formulate a legal 
strategy.49 Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit in McWilliams concluded that the appointed 
psychiatrist did not meet Ake’s requirements because the defendant 
had no opportunity to meet with the psychiatrist for evaluation or 
discussion of possible defenses, the psychiatrist did not help prepare 
the defense, and the lack of an additional psychiatrist left the defense 
without an opportunity to rebut the damaging report presented by 
the court-appointed psychiatrist.50 Although Ake entitles an indigent 
defendant access to an expert, Ake and its successive cases declined 
to resolve whether that entitles the defense their own, independent 
expert.51  
 
Pursuant to Ake, the Court will likely determine the 
appointed expert did not suffice because the expert did not provide 
more than a psychiatric examination of Keefe for trial and 
subsequent sentencing hearings.52 Similar to McWilliams and 
McCormick, Keefe and his counsel lacked access to the expert to 
evaluate reports regarding Keefe’s mental condition or help prepare 
 
46 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 473 (2012).  
47 137 S. Ct. 1790 (2017).  
48 914 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1990).  
49 McWilliams, 137 S. Ct. at 1800.  
50 McCormick, 914 F.2d at 1158–59.  
51 See Ake, 470 U.S. at 83; McWilliams, 137 S. Ct. at 1800; McCormick, 914 F.2d 
at 1159 (concluding that given the specific circumstances, the defendant was 
entitled to their own expert, not that the defense is always entitled to their own 
expert). 
52 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 5; Brief of Appellee, supra note 2, 
at 14.  
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his defense. Thus, in accordance with both McWilliams and 
McCormick, Keefe was not provided the assistance prescribed by 
Ake. In summary, if the Court finds Keefe adequately demonstrated 
his sanity at the time of the offense would be a significant factor at 
trial or that he is entitled to a jury determination regarding 
irreparable corruption, then the Court will also likely conclude 
Keefe is constitutionally entitled to an expert and further that the 
appointed expert did not meet Ake’s requirements because he did 
not provide more than an examination of Keefe.  
 
B. Resentencing Hearing 
 
To determine whether Keefe was afforded a proper Miller 
resentencing hearing, the Court will need to analyze whether the 
district court appropriately considered the mitigating factors of 
Keefe’s youth. Miller v. Alabama entitles a juvenile defendant to 
considerations of the mitigating factors of their youth prior to 
imposition of a life sentence without the possibility of parole.53 
These factors include immaturity, failure to appreciate risks and 
consequences, family environment, and potential for 
rehabilitation.54 Since Miller applies retroactively in cases on 
“collateral review,” such as here, where Keefe is seeking post-
conviction relief,55 if there has been a significant time lapse between 
the defendant’s initial crime and the Miller hearing, the analysis will 
involve evidence of post-incarceration rehabilitation because the 
defendant’s capacity for rehabilitation may preclude imposition of a 
life sentence without parole.56 For purposes of resentencing, 
whether a defendant has “change[d] in some fundamental way” 
since the commission of the offense is “key evidence” when 
conducting a Miller analysis to ascertain whether the defendant 
exhibits the capacity for change, thereby negating a finding of 
irreparable corruption and permanent incorrigibility.57 Thus, to 
determine whether Keefe was provided a sufficient Miller hearing, 
the Court’s analysis will hinge on whether Keefe was capable of 
 
53 567 U.S. 460, 477–78 (2012) (concluding that mandatory sentences of life 
without parole for juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment, and such a sentence 
is reserved for rare cases where the juvenile exhibits irreparable corruption and 
permanent incorrigibility). 
54 Id. 
55 Justice Alito defined “collateral review” in Wall v. Kholi as “a judicial 
reexamination of a judgment or claim in a proceeding outside of the direct review 
process.” 562 U.S. 545, 547 (2011).  
56 Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 732 (2016) (stating that “Miller 
announced a substantive rule that is retroactive in cases on collateral review.”); 
United States v. Briones, 929 F.3d 1057, 1067 (9th Cir. 2019).   
57 United States v. Pete, 819 F.3d 1121, 1133 (9th Cir. 2016).  
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change, and whether he was granted the opportunity to provide 
evidence of such change.58 
 
Integrated with the issue of whether Keefe was provided an 
adequate Miller hearing is the issue of whether Keefe was entitled 
to a jury determination that he was irreparably corrupt and 
permanently incorrigible. To resolve this issue, this Court will look 
to Apprendi v. New Jersey59 and two subsequent cases, Blakely v. 
Washington60 and State v. Garrymore,61 for guidance. Apprendi 
entitles a defendant to jury resolution of any fact that increases the 
defendant’s penalty beyond the statutory maximum supported by the 
jury verdict or admissions by the defendant.62 Applying the law 
from Apprendi, the Supreme Court in Blakely concluded that 
enhancing the defendant’s sentence based on a judicial finding of 
“deliberate cruelty” was improper and the defendant was entitled to 
submission to a jury because the enhancement was not supported by 
the jury verdict or defendant’s admissions.63 Also applying the law 
from Apprendi, the Court in Garrymore emphasized that a 
sentencing judge maintains broad discretion when determining 
sentence parameters and a defendant is not entitled to jury resolution 
of all facts, only those that enhance the sentence to one unsupported 
by the jury verdict or defendant’s admissions.64 After Garrymore 
was sentenced to life imprisonment and the judge concluded he was 
ineligible for parole due to his prior convictions and lack of remorse, 
this Court held that his Sixth Amendment rights were not violated 
because those particular facts were not relevant to whether the 
defendant had a “legal right to a lesser sentence.”65 
 
The Court will likely conclude Keefe is entitled to jury 
resolution regarding irreparable corruption and permanent 
incorrigibility because such a finding is required to constitutionally 
make him parole ineligible, and the jury did not consider this factor 
because Miller had not yet been decided nor did Keefe admit such a 
 
58 Briones, 929 F.3d at 1067 (citing Pete, 819 F.3d at 1133).  
59 530 U.S. 466 (2000).  
60 542 U.S. 296 (2004).  
61 145 P.3d 946 (Mont. 2006).  
62 530 U.S. at 490 (concluding that although the purpose to intimidate “sentence 
enhancer” was not an explicit element of the crime, it was entitled to submission 
to a jury because it increased the defendant’s sentence beyond what was 
authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict); Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303 (citing Ring v. 
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002)).  
63 Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303 (explaining that any specific fact, including an 
aggravating fact, that enhances a defendant’s sentence beyond the statutory 
maximum must be supported by the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant, 
otherwise it is entitled to submission to the jury).  
64 Garrymore, 145 P.3d at 952.  
65 Id. at 953 (citing Blakely, 542 U.S. at 309) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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finding. The jury was incapable of considering irreparable 
corruption and permanent incorrigibility when Keefe was initially 
convicted because Miller was not decided until more than twenty 
years later. Additionally, Keefe rebutted a finding that he was 
irreparably corrupt and permanently incorrigible by asserting he had 
rehabilitated during his years incarcerated. Similar to Blakely, the 
sentencing judge independently determined whether Keefe was 
irreparably corrupt and permanently incorrigible; therefore, unless 
the facts from the jury verdict can support this finding, Keefe will 
likely be entitled to submission to a jury. Consistent with appellee’s 
assertions, it seems at first glance that Keefe is not entitled to jury 
resolution, due to the broad discretion a sentencing judge is afforded 
at sentencing.66  
 
However, the Court will likely conclude otherwise because 
Keefe’s case exhibits several important distinguishing factors from 
Garrymore. First, unlike Garrymore, Keefe was a juvenile and 
accordingly, life imprisonment without the possibility of parole was 
not within his maximum possible sentence permitted by statute.67 
Therefore, the judge in Garrymore was afforded broader discretion 
to make Garrymore parole ineligible because Garrymore was not 
entitled to the additional protections that juveniles are provided in 
the criminal justice system.68 Second, considerations of prior 
criminal history and lack of remorse are distinct from a finding of 
irreparable corruption and permanent incorrigibility, which has been 
reserved for “rare” juveniles and based on specific considerations of 
youth and capacity of rehabilitation.69 Therefore, consistent with 
Apprendi, Blakely and their progeny, Keefe is likely entitled to jury 
resolution because such a conclusion enhances his sentence beyond 
the statutory maximum authorized by Miller and supported by 
Keefe’s admissions, unless a review of the facts accepted by the jury 
is capable of supporting such a finding. 
 
 Consistent with the conclusion that Keefe is likely entitled 
to a jury finding regarding irreparable corruption and permanent 
incorrigibility, the Court will likely find Keefe was not afforded a 
sufficient Miller hearing because the mitigating attributes of his 
youth and evidence of rehabilitation were not given proper 
consideration. Specifically, the Court will likely conclude that Keefe 
is entitled to present evidence of post-incarceration rehabilitation 
 
66 Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 2, at 45; Garrymore, 145 P.3d at 953–
55.  
67 MONT. CODE ANN. § 46–18–222(1).  
68 See Garrymore, 145 P.3d at 953–55; Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 
(2012).  
69 See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 726 (2016); Miller, 567 U.S. at 
479–80. 
2020                       PREVIEW: KEEFE V. KIRKEGARD 
 
50 
because a significant amount of time has lapsed since the crime and 
it refutes the conclusion that he is irreparably corrupt and 
permanently incorrigible, thus it is determinative of whether he can 
constitutionally be sentenced to life without parole.70 Additionally, 
evidence of post-incarceration rehabilitation is specifically relevant 
to whether Keefe has a “legal right to a lesser sentence,” pursuant to 
Miller.71 This is consistent with the agreed upon view that prospects 
of rehabilitation and impact of incarceration are relevant evidence at 
a Miller resentencing hearing.72 Further, the Court will likely 
conclude it was improper to not consider evidence of Keefe’s 
childhood abuse and neglect because Miller and the following cases 
affirm that those factors are relevant to whether the defendant’s 
actions reflect transient immaturity rather than irreparable 
corruption and permanent incorrigibility.73 In conclusion, because 
Keefe is entitled to consideration of the unique characteristics of his 
youth at the time of the offenses, the Court will likely find Keefe is 
entitled to jury resolution regarding irreparable corruption and 
entitled to present evidence of rehabilitation and childhood abuse 




The Court will likely conclude that (1) Keefe is entitled to 
expert assistance and the appointed psychiatrist did not suffice, and 
(2) Keefe was not afforded a proper Miller hearing and should be 
allowed to present evidence of post-incarceration rehabilitation. 
Further, Keefe v. Kirkegard offers the Montana Supreme Court an 
opportunity to address several unresolved constitutional issues 
pertaining to juveniles in the criminal justice system. Is a juvenile 
defendant entitled to jury resolution that they are irreparably 
corrupt? Does a judicial finding of irreparable corruption violate 
their constitutional rights under the Sixth or Eighth Amendments? 
Resolving these questions provides the Court a chance to contribute 
to the ongoing discussion regarding the constitutional ramifications 
 
70 See Miller, 567 U.S. at 478; United States v. Briones, 929 F.3d 1057, 1067 (9th 
Cir. 2019).  
71 Miller, 567 U.S. at 479; Briones, 929 F.3d at 1067; Pete, 819 F.3d at 1133. 
72 See Miller, 567 U.S. at 479 (“A State is not required to guarantee eventual 
freedom, but must provide some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based 
on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation” (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 
48, 74 (2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted); Briones, 929 F.3d at 1067; 
Pete, 819 F.3d at 1133. 
73 Miller, 567 U.S. at 476 (explaining that the Court had previously found 
“evidence [of abuse and neglect] ‘particularly relevant’ – more so than it would 
have been in the case of an adult offender.”) (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 
U.S. 104, 115 (1982)).  
74 Id. at 472–75. 
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of sentencing a juvenile to life imprisonment, and further imposing 
parole ineligibility.  
 
